Maritime Compliance Report

 The maritime security regulations call for the use of a Declaration of Security (DOS) during certain times and situations when there a heightened security threat. The International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code takes a more general approach to the DOS than do the very specific U.S. Coast Guard regulations on the topic, which spell out which types of interfaces require a DOS at which MARSEC levels.

Operators can rid themselves of the headaches associated with inconsistent inspectors and prepare themselves for litigation by insuring they know the regulations and that they manage their own compliance. 

Here's a quiz: What are the three words on the triangle at the center of all TWICs? If a person granting access to a secure area has actually been examining TWICs each time as required, then surely they would remember that those three words are: "privacy, security and commerce." And by the way, poor eyesight is not a good excuse for not complying with a federal regulation. If they cannot see what they are required to check by regulation, they have no business being posted at such a position. Reading glasses or a magnifying glass would come in handy in those situations. Also, you'd also be surprised with what an inexpensive black light will show on a TWIC. 

So why is it OK now if some credentialed mariners don't have TWICs? The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 is counter-terrorism legislation which requires the prevention or deterrence of a transportation security incident (TSI). A "TSI" is defined as a security incident resulting in significant loss of life, environmental damage, transportation system disruption, or economic disruption in a particular area. The Coast Guard, in establishing the applicability of the security regulations, determined some vessels to be at a low risk of being involved in a TSI, and excluded them from the applicability. It is those vessels, which are at low risk of a TSI and have no security plan, which will be allowed to have captains without TWICs. Whether you agree with this or not, one good thing which I hope may come from it is it may help us refocus on the intent of the security regulations, which is to prevent or deter a transportation security incident (TSI), and to avoid the complacency of, to borrow a phrase, "security theater." 

Port security funds are supposed to be allocated to projects that will have the greatest impact. So, why would scarce taxpayer dollars be spent on fences and cameras to protect non-threatening areas such as settling ponds far away from the nearest waterway? The answer, most likely, is human error. The International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code requires port facilities around the globe to comply with the maritime security requirements of the Code. For U.S. port facilities, the U.S. Coast Guard regulations derived from Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 provided a definition of the term "facility." However, many years later, there are still conflicting opinions regarding what portions of a facility must be included under the maritime security regulations. The definition of a facility, beyond the description of the waterfront portion, calls for "any contiguous or adjoining property" to be included. Despite this definition, some facilities simply fenced off their docks, called that their facility, and got away with it. Other similar facilities were required to spend tens of thousands of dollars on fencing and other access control issues for their entire property.To clarify "contiguous property," the Coast Guard published guidance which states that in a case where a public street (such as a river road) splits a facility property, the maritime security regulations may only apply to the water side of the road. The example used in the policy guidance is an oil or hazardous material transfer facility with a pipeline crossing over the road. Despite this guidance, there are many facilities where the regulations have been applied to both sides of the road. In addition to costing facilities a great deal of money having to implement a set of regulations where they shouldn't apply, port security grant money is allocated in some cases to secure areas that are no threat at all of a transportation security incident (TSI). It's important to get a facility's footprint correct, not only to save the facility money on implementation issues such as Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) requirements, but to ensure that the country's limited maritime security resources are spent where the threat is the greatest.   Some Coast Guard personnel may attribute this disparity to individual Captain of the Port (COTP) authority. But in reality, many of these mistakes were made initially due to a lack of understanding of the applicability and policy guidance. We have been successful in getting a number of these facility footprints corrected through the Coast Guard's formal appeals process, saving the facilities thousands of dollars and hopefully avoiding future misappropriation of port security grant money.   Industry should not shy away from questioning the opinions of enforcement personnel out of fear of retaliation. The Coast Guard's policy is that it encourages appeals from industry. Everyone benefits from a constructive dialogue. Going along with things that you know are incorrect usually just leaves you chasing your tail every time a new inspector shows up. 

 As we wait for the results of the investigation into the BP/ Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, one thing appears fairly certain based upon currently published information, and that is that corners may have been cut and unnecessary risks may have been taken. This is not really surprising. We cut corners and take calculated risks every day, often with no negative consequences. Who has never exceeded the speed limit while driving? The natural reaction of politicians and bureaucrats is to make more laws and regulations to fix the problems before we know for sure what the problems are. We may find that the problem wasn't a lack of adequate laws and regulations, but perhaps it was the lack of enforcement, oversight and compliance with the existing laws and regulations. If so, why would the level of enforcement, oversight and compliance drop to a level where an accident like this might occur? Perhaps because they had not had a major accident with similar operations in the recent past to remind them of the threat. BP was reportedly celebrating a safety milestone at the time of the disastrous blowout. If people have not experienced a major accident in quite some time, their minds allow them to believe the threat has become diminished. In actuality the threat has not diminished with the passage of time, but still corners are cut and unnecessary risks are taken, because the precautions that once seemed necessary may now seem like overkill.  Following the attacks of 9/11, the international community passed the ISPS code. Ships, boats, ports and facilities around the world are required to implement security plans which address all relevant threat scenarios. As the years go by without major successful attacks, it is human nature to let our guard down because in our minds the threat has diminished. It has not. Even after six years of full implementation of maritime security plans, many do not understand the threat or the requirements. Do enforcement personnel understand their roles and give full attention to the security programs, or are they still focused mostly on signage and paperwork? Do industry members have good plans that address specific threat scenarios and give clear and concise guidance to those charged with implementing them? Are proper screening, monitoring and drilling conducted as intended by the regulations? We can't go back in time and make those involved in the BP/ Deepwater Horizon disaster make different decisions, but going forward we can ensure we do not lose sight of the threats to our security in the maritime industry. Imagine the answers that would be given to Anderson Cooper on CNN in the weeks following a terrorist attack involving your vessel or port facility. Would they be adequate? Or would it be déjà vu?